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Abstract:
This article examines the relationship between the global financial crisis 
and Corporate Social Responsibility reporting of financial services firms. 
We challenge the view in existing studies that firms, when faced with 
economic hardship, tend to jettison CSR commitments. Instead, and 
building on insights into the institutional determinants of CSR, we argue 
that firms are constrained in their ability to abandon CSR by the extent 
to which they are subject to intense public scrutiny by regulators and the 
news media. We test this argument in the context of the European 
sovereign debt crisis drawing on a unique dataset of 170 firms in 15 
different countries over a six-year period. Controlling for a battery of 
alternative explanations and comparing financial service providers to 
firms operating in other economic sectors, we find considerable evidence 
supporting our argument. Rather than abandoning CSR during times of 
economic hardship, financial industry firms ramp up their CSR 
commitments in order to manage their public image and foster public 
trust in light of intense public scrutiny. 
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Introduction
The 2007 global financial crisis substantially changed the nature of the relationship between 
financial industry firms and society. A stream of corporate scandals and the collapse or 
nationalization of large firms in the wake of the crisis (e.g., Bears Sterns, Northern Rock, and 
Lehman Brothers in the USA, as well as ABN-AMRO and Royal Bank of Scotland in Europe) 
seriously tarnished the public image of the financial services industry. Investment banks, 
insurance providers, and hedge fund managers, largely held responsible for the crisis, 
especially in the context of regulatory failure (de Larosiere 2009; see also BIS 2008; FSA 2009; 
IMF 2009), found themselves scrambling to rebuild their public image and restore a modicum 
of trust in society. 
This article examines the impact of the financial crisis on one aspect of these efforts: 
namely Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).1 Firms’ CSR commitments and disclosures not 
only came under the spotlight during the crisis, revealing weaknesses in structures of corporate 
governance, but were also seen as a panacea for ameliorating the financial impact of the crisis 
(Giannarakis & Theotokas 2011). Perhaps not surprisingly, our question has already attracted 
considerable scholarly attention (most notably Fernadez-Feijoo Souto 2009; Giannarakis & 
Theotokas 2011; Karaibrahimoglu 2010; Njoroge 2009; Wilson 2009; Lopatta & Kaspereit 
2014; Herzig & Moon 2011; Theofilou, Grigore & Stancu 2016; Idowu, Vertigans & Burlea 
2017). For many scholars, a chief concern has been the extent to which the financial crisis has 
negatively impacted firms’ CSR commitments. CSR commitments are costly and, despite 
providing potential long-term net financial benefits, are an easy way to save money in times of 
economic uncertainty (see Fernadez-Feijoo Souto 2009; Giannarakis & Theotokas 2011; 
Karaibrahimoglu 2010; Njoroge 2009; Wilson 2009; Lopatta & Kaspereit 2014; Herzig & 
Moon 2011).2 In short, in order to survive in times of crisis, firms are often incentivized to 
focus on the ‘vital’ aspects of business and will therefore put CSR commitments on hold. 
Our analysis examines this perspective, focusing on the assumptions linking a firm’s 
immediate economic and financial context to their CSR commitments. Building on recent 
insights regarding the institutional determinants of CSR (notably Brammer, Jackson & Matten 
2012; Campbell 2007; Marens 2012; Kang & Moon 2012; Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & 
Ganapathi 2007; Matten & Moon 2008; Jackson & Apostolakou 2010; Koos 2012), we argue 
that this line of thinking is too ‘agent-centric’: it assumes that firms single-handedly determine 
their CSR commitments outside of the external constraints of their respective fields of 
economic governance and modes of market and state regulation. Current institutional 
approaches to CSR elaborate on how the broader social environment within which firms 
operate can shape and influence a firm’s decision to engage in and disclose CSR commitments. 
For example, how varieties of capitalism (Kang & Moon 2012; Marens 2012; Koos 2012), 
distinct business and regulatory systems (Matten & Moon 2008; Campbell 2007), and 
structures of corporate governance (Kang & Moon 2012) shape firms’ CSR commitments. 
A less developed but important insight in this literature (e.g. Schreck and Raithel 2018) 
relates to firms’ ‘visibility’. Firms that are more visible to the public and that receive more 
public scrutiny tend to experience more pressure to make and disclose information on their 
CSR commitments. In fact, effectively communicating details about CSR commitments 
through formal disclosure procedures becomes a way for firms to shape their public image and 
claw back public trust (see Shabana, Buchholtz, and Carroll 2017; Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo 
1 The CSR concept is notoriously difficult to define (see Campbell 2007, p. 950). For the purposes of this article, 
we define CSR as the voluntary action of a corporation aimed at improving the quality of life within society and 
taking a broad range of different stakeholders into account. CSR reporting, then, refers to: ‘the issue of standalone 
reports that provide information regarding a company’s economic, environmental and social performance’ 
(Carroll and Shabana 2010).
2 For a recent study challenging this claim, see Lins, Servaes and Tamayo (2017).
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2017). Our central purpose in this article is to further develop these insights and engage in more 
explicit theorizing about how visibility and public scrutiny act as additional institutional 
constraints, and opportunities, on how firms disclose information on CSR commitments, 
especially in the context of economic hardship. First, we contend that financial volatility leads 
firms to engage in more comprehensive and extensive reporting of their CSR commitments. 
Our argument is that crises have their own ‘demonstration effects’, increasing firms’ visibility. 
Crises work to highlight the dubious activities of CEOs, investment managers, and other 
financial industry actors and can expose industry efforts to avoid more stringent regulation in 
the post-crisis period. Second, we examine how attention in the news media can increase a 
firms’ visibility thereby increasing public scrutiny and challenging a firm’s stock of public 
trust as well as its public image. Our contention is that intense news media attention drives 
firms to increase reporting of CSR commitments. 
We test our argument using a unique dataset comprising information on CSR 
disclosures for over 170 European firms operating in financial services and in other sectors for 
the financial crisis period (2007 to 2012).3 Importantly, our dataset allows us to compare 
finance to other economic sectors and hence to control for sector-specific differences (on this 
point see Beliveau, Cottril & O'Neill 1994; Venanzi & Fidanza 2006). Our focus on the 
financial sector in Europe during the financial crisis also constitutes a type of ‘least likely case’ 
for our argument. A financial crisis is an extreme form of economic downturn and the 
assumption we seek to challenge is that firms facing economic hardship will be incentivized to 
jettison their CSR commitments. Finding evidence that this assumption does not hold during 
this time of extreme economic hardship, stress, and volatility should imply greater 
generalizability for our theory.
Controlling for a number of alternative explanations, our statistical analysis produces 
several key findings. First, we find robust evidence showing that firms tend to engage in more 
comprehensive CSR reporting during times of extreme financial volatility. This finding 
challenges the assumption that firms invariably decrease their CSR engagements during times 
of economic hardship. Second, we find that firms’ CSR reporting is positively correlated with 
increased public scrutiny. Faced with mounting public pressure, firms tend to engage in more 
extensive reporting. Our findings therefore support research linking CSR engagement and CSR 
disclosure to how firms manage their public image and shape their reputation  (Schreck and 
Raithel 2018; McDonnell and King 2013; Shabana, Buchholtz, and Carroll 2017; McDonnell, 
King, and Soule 2015). Third, we find that firms operating in the financial services industry 
are not uniquely susceptible to these effects. In fact, our findings show that finance is slightly 
more resistant to the impact of public scrutiny than firms operating in other sectors. Though 
financial firms do tend to respond to public scrutiny by more extensive CSR reporting, this 
effect is not proportional to the extreme levels of public scrutiny they faced during the height 
of the financial crisis. 
Economic Hardship, Crises, and CSR
Many scholars predict a distinctly negative relationship between periods of crisis and CSR. 
The underlying logic is derived from a broader literature linking CSR to a firms’ financial 
performance and its short-term financial concerns (Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes 2003; Coombs 
& Gilley 2005; Griffin & Mahon 1997; Hillman & Keim 2001; McWilliams & Siegel 2000; 
Roberts & Dowling 2002). Though ramped up CSR can improve a firm’s bottom line (Frooman 
1997; Griffin & Mahon 1997; Waddock & Graves 1997), this does not hold during times of 
financial crises, economic downturns, or general market volatility, which create uncertain 
3 To include a wide variety of financial volatility, we include data one year before the offset of the financial crisis 
until one year after the end of the financial crisis, resulting in a timeframe between 2007 and 2012.
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business environments. The central assumption is that firms, seeking to maximize profits and 
shareholder value, only engage in CSR when it is financially feasible. A harsh economic 
climate or sharp economic downturn puts pressure on firms’ so-called non-vital activities 
(Waddock & Graves 1997; Karaibrahimoglu 2010; Campbell, 2007, p. 952). Hence, when 
resources are tight, firms are forced to cut back expenses and are incentivized to jettison CSR 
commitments. 
The same insights have been applied to understanding CSR commitments during the global 
financial crisis of 2007. Within this uncertain business climate (Karaibrahimoglu 2010, p. 384; 
Herzig & Moon 2011) firms were less liquid and therefore harder pressed to justify a continued 
stream of resources to CSR. “The most important negative impact of CSR to companies is the 
potential cost for the implementation of CSR initiatives” (Karaibrahimoglu 2010, p. 3) and this 
is only exacerbated during times of crisis. Firms try to “avoid the negative effects of crises by 
remedial actions: such as cutting costs by laying off workers, postponing investments, reducing 
budgets for the following year in a contraction manner, consuming less” (Karaibrahimoglu 
2010, p. 384f; on the same point see also Herzig & Moon 2011; Orlitzky et al. 2003). For 
Njoroge (2009), CSR initiatives can be delayed or cancelled because of the financial crisis. 
Fernadez-Feijoo Souto (2009, p. 43) argues that the stakes are even higher: “CSR in periods of 
crisis is a threat to firms’ survival”. Empirical tests seem to bear out these assumptions. Most 
notably, Karaibrahimoglu’s (2010) content analysis of annual non-financial reports shows that 
companies decreased their reporting of CSR projects in response to the financial downturn.
Recent advances in the broader CSR literature, however, challenge this assumption about 
the negative link between economic hardship and CSR commitments. Scholars drawing on 
insights from theories of institutionalism have highlighted the extent to which CSR decisions 
are not made in a complete vacuum nor are wholly within “the realm of voluntary action” 
(Brammer et al. 2012, p. 7). Instead, CSR is also shaped by factors beyond the control of firms 
and located in the institutional context within which they operate (Aguilera et al. 2007; 
Campbell 2007; Matten & Moon 2008). Institutionalism, in other words, challenges the agent-
centric perspective of the determinants of CSR commitments that has largely been adopted by 
management studies (see Brammer et al. 2012, p. 5). Jacob (2012) shows in a case-study that 
CSR can positively affect a company’s reputational value, and firms therefore will increase 
CSR on topics that primary stakeholders deem important. For our purposes, institutionalism 
questions the extent to which firms are free to jettison CSR commitments during times of 
economic hardship.
Scholars have adopted an institutional approach to CSR by variously examining firms’ 
general business environment or “broader social context” (Jackson & Apostolakou 2010, 
p.374). Scholars point out important differences in CSR commitments as they relate to state 
and market regulations, systems of corporate governance, institutionalized norms of 
appropriate corporate behavior, as well as states’ capacity to monitor firms’ activities 
(Campbell 2007, p. 948ff). One prominent approach applies insights from the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature to studies of CSR. From this perspective, firms operating under the 
conditions of a liberal market economy (LME) tend to adopt more ‘explicit’ forms of CSR to 
compensate for the missing institutionalized arrangements characteristic of Coordinated 
Market Economies (CME) (Jackson and Bartosch 2016; Kang & Moon 2012; Marens 2012; 
Jackson & Apostolakou 2010; Matten & Moon 2008). 
Similarly, scholars have also highlighted the fact that CSR is shaped by important 
sector-level differences. On one level, CSR operates through a kind of “corporate peer 
pressure” where firms operating in a specific industry implement, monitor, and enforce 
“regulatory mechanisms to ensure fair practices, product quality, workplace safety” (Campbell 
2007, p. 954). On another level, firms operating in the same sector tend to face “similar 
challenges” and, by extension, similar “CSR patterns and regulations are likely to develop, 
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affecting CSR standards and forcing CSR policies implemented by firms in those industries to 
converge” (Jackson & Apostolakou 2010, p. 374; see also Koos 2012, p. 143; Beliveau et al. 
1994; Venanzi & Fidanza 2006). As demonstrated in Jackson and Apostolakou (2010), so-
called high impact sectors, like extractive industries, automobile manufacturing, and chemicals 
manufacturing, face unique challenges and risks related to the environment, consumer 
protection, and the economy, and hence are more likely to make CSR commitments to offset 
these risks. Sector-specific institutional differences are not confined to the state and can instead 
be transnational, impacting firms across any number of countries and producing isomorphism 
among firms operating in similar sectors (see Jackson & Apostolakou 2010, p. 375). These 
pressures are particularly salient for multinational corporations.  As scholars working in the 
field of international business studies point out, multinational corporations have to contend 
with different and often competing host-state institutions that can inform their CSR 
commitments (Marano, Tashman, and Kostova 2017; Marano and Kostova 2016). 
Finally, scholars also highlight how a firm’s visibility, and hence related scrutiny by 
the public and the news media, affects its CSR decisions. First, visibility tends to vary by 
industry: firms operating in so-called ‘high-impact’ industries (like extractive industries) 
compared to ‘low-impact’ industries (like consumer services), are simply more visible (Jackson 
and Apostolakou 2010, 372). At the same time, firm visibility can be exploited by a number of 
external stakeholders. Environmental NGOs, consumer protection groups, and regulators, for 
instance, can increase public pressure on firms to implement or keep their CSR commitments 
(Koos 2012, p. 143; Doh and Guay 2006). Equally, the news media monitors firms’ behavior 
and calls attention to socially irresponsible activities, making it more likely that companies 
engage in CSR (Campbell 2007, p. 958). Finally, firms can also be directly targeted by 
consumer boycotts and thereby face considerable reputational risks. An emerging line of 
scholarship marries insights from social movements theory and organizational theory and 
shows how firms targeted by consumer boycotts use CSR commitments and disclosures to 
actively reshape their public image and bolster their reputation (for example, McDonnell, King, 
and Soule 2015; McDonnell and King 2013.
Firm Visibility, Financial Crises, and Public Scrutiny
A central purpose of this article is to contribute to these recent advances in institutional 
approaches to CSR. We do so by further developing insights about firm visibility and public 
scrutiny and examining how these factors shape CSR commitments. To this end, and in what 
follows, we examine firm visibility in terms of two main factors: financial crises and public 
scrutiny. 
First, financial crises do not only affect a firm’s bottom line. Instead, crises have 
“demonstration effects” (Baker 2010; Chalmers 2015) that link a firm’s behavior to the causes 
of the crisis and can work to negatively impact a firm’s level of public trust. Periods of extreme 
financial volatility expose the negative externalities of financial sector involvement in 
regulatory issues. Undue financial sector influence over financial regulations, for instance, 
thrives on periods of financial boom when private-sector actors find themselves relatively 
unopposed by countervailing (public) interests (Baker 2010: 625). Large-scale events, like 
financial crises, however, can magnify financial fluctuations and shine a light on weak 
regulations.
As financial markets become increasingly stressed and more volatile, regulators are 
more prone to re-regulate specific industries, and industry actors find themselves harder-
pressed to justify the furtherance of self-regulation and their close involvement in regulatory 
decision-making processes. Faced with the possibility of more stringent regulation imposed 
from a regulatory agency, many firms opt to impose more stringent self-regulations (Baker 
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2010). As Moon (2005) argues, firms tend to engage in (transparent) CSR to anticipate the 
threat of stricter national or supranational regulation (on the same point, see Kinderman 2012). 
Additionally, in the wake of the crisis, firms experience a decline in legitimacy, i.e. the social 
acceptance of firms and their activities (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990). Faced with higher public 
criticism, firms find themselves fighting to regain their social license to operate, in other words, 
their public consent (van Marrewijk 2003, p.97). To gain or secure legitimacy from main 
stakeholders, and to manage reputational risks, companies will report more on sustainability, 
particularly on issues of governance and environmental policies (Jacob 2012). Crises implicate 
firms in economic downturns, undermining a firm’s position in society, diminishing trust, and 
ultimately harming the value of a firm’s brand. Restoring public trust and rebuilding a brand is 
dependent upon the provision of publicly available information on firms’ social and 
environmental responsibilities (Gray 2001, p. 11). CSR reporting is therefore a way for firms 
to effectively communicate information about their CSR commitments (Deegan 2007).4 These 
insights lead to our first hypothesis. 
H1: Financial Volatility: the greater the levels of financial volatility, the more firms 
will engage in extensive reporting of their CSR commitments. 
News media attention can also function to increase firms’ visibility and, subsequently, 
increase pressure to engage in and report CSR commitments. The news media can subject firms 
to the threat of public exposure, functioning as a watchdog that informs the public about 
corporate activities and hence poses a threat of public exposure (Campbell 2007, pp. 956-58; 
Margolis and Walsh 2003). Along with NGOs and consumer protection groups, the news media 
acts as an additional ‘external stakeholder’ monitoring and reporting on corporate 
(mis)behavior (Koos 2012, p. 143). The media can be critical in mobilizing social movements 
as well, which is particularly noticeable within the environmental sphere (Bansal and Clelland 
2004). A study by Schreck and Raithel (2018) finds that visibility, which they operationalize 
as media coverage, has a significant, positive effect on the CSR disclosure. They conclude that 
firms use sustainability reports to respond to external pressure as high levels of visibility leads 
to more legitimacy pressures.
Furthermore, the news media can enhance the salience of regulatory issues, increase 
the public scrutiny of particular firms and particular industries, and name and shame firms by 
further implicating them in an economic downturn or by highlighting socially irresponsible 
activities (or even jettisoning such activities). Public scrutiny causes firms to be more sensitive 
to social and political stakeholders and therefore drives the willingness to engage in 
sustainability (Brammer and Millington 2006). For Culpepper (2011), the critical difference is 
between so-called ‘quiet politics’ and ‘loud politics’. During periods of quiet politics, when 
there is little media attention and issues remain less salient, firms can fly under of radar of 
public attention. However, focusing events and increased media attention can magnify issue 
salience turning quiet politics loud. Under these conditions of extreme media scrutiny firms 
find themselves constrained in their ability to carry any number of functions, including any 
attempts to decrease or diminish their CSR commitments. These insights lead to a second 
hypothesis.
4 Importantly, an often-cited caveat is that changing levels of CSR disclosure do not include behavioral change. 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), for instance, distinguish between substantive and symbolic change; substantive 
change involves real, material change, whereas symbolic change does not involve actual change but simply a 
change in portraying commitments (1990, pp. 178-180). Nonetheless, CSR disclosure and standardized reporting 
frameworks are the main instrument for stakeholders to hold companies accountable (Hess, 2007, p. 453). This is 
reflected in the increased global call for greater corporate transparency and higher levels of accountability (Kolk 
2008).
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H2: Public Scrutiny: the higher the levels of media attention, the more firms will 
engage in extensive reporting of their CSR commitments.
Finally, we make a comparison of financial services corporations and firms operating 
in other sectors (e.g., manufacturing, telecommunications, retail, etc.). As such, we build on 
insights that CSR has important sector-specific differences (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008), 
many of which are transnational in character and can lead to a type of isomorphism of CSR 
commitments within specific sectors of activity. For this study, the unique role of financial 
service providers (banks, insurers, fund managers, etc.) in the financial crisis should impact 
their decisions to report more extensively on their CSR commitments. After all, financial 
services firms were deeply implicated in the crisis, especially in terms of weakening the 
financial regulatory architecture at the national, EU, and international levels (de Larosiere 
2009; see also BIS 2008; FSA 2009; IMF 2009). In fact, many scholars have indicated that the 
crisis was at least partly the result of regulatory capture: a situation where financial services 
firms were determining the content of financial regulation themselves (Baker 2010; Lall 2012; 
Helleiner & Porter 2009; Chalmers 2015). Finally, financial services firms not only faced 
conditions of extreme financial volatility during the crisis, in some instances leading to collapse 
or (re-) nationalization, but were also subject to considerable naming and shaming practices in 
the news media. This leads to our third hypothesis.
H3: Financial Sector: during times of financial volatility and increased public scrutiny, 
financial services firms will engage in more extensive CSR reporting than firms 
operating in other sectors. 
Research Design
The aim of this article is to examine the effects of the financial crisis on European firms’ CSR 
reporting. Our focus on European firms acknowledges that the financial crisis was a variegated 
phenomenon that took on different shapes and had different impacts in different parts of the 
world. In other words, despite being interconnected, it would be misleading to conflate the US 
sub-prime mortgage crisis with the European sovereign debt crisis. Our focus on Europe 
therefore allows us to control for some of these differences. In Europe, the crisis played out 
primarily as a sovereign debt crisis with several European Union (EU) member state 
governments unable to pay down national debt or to bailout highly indebted banks. The 
mechanisms of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which is tasked with 
controlling inflation, limited governments’ ability to react to the crisis. Indeed, the fact that all 
the firms considered in this analysis are also part of the EU further justifies our focus on 
European firms. 
The remainder of this section explains how we have operationalized our four 
hypotheses as well as various control variables, and provides details on data collection and data 
reliability. Descriptive statistics for all indicators used in this analysis can be found in the online 
appendix.
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
We measure CSR using the GRI database.5 GRI maps out principles and detailed indicators for 
reporting on every aspect of CSR performance, combining economic and environmental 
indicators with social performance (Albareda 2013; KPMG International Survey of Corporate 
Responsibility Reporting 2005; Carroll and Shabana 2010). Empirical studies comparing GRI 
5 For more information on GRI standards see: https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-
download-center/?g=1a630346-c73d-40eb-a5b1-3a82199f6955
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to similar databases, like the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, the KMPG International Survey 
of CSR Reporting, show its superior reliability and coverage (Gjolberg 2009, p. 13f; Etzion & 
Ferraro 2010; Kolk 2005), something that is reflected in its widespread use in the European 
Union and in countries of the OECD (Albareda 2013; Menichini and Rosati, 2014; Hedberg 
and Von Malmborg, 2003; Legendre and Coderre, 2013). 
The GRI database consists of CSR reports and evaluations for individual firms per year. 
Importantly, GRI data comprises information on CRS disclosures and therefore not actual CRS 
activities or outcomes. We justify the use of disclosure data in two ways. First, our theoretical 
framework focuses on the reputation building activities of firms facing economic hardship. 
Indeed, through CSR reporting, companies are able to showcase their CSR commitments; they 
illustrate that their operations are consistent with social expectations and norms (Carroll and 
Shabana 2010). A company’s CSR reporting is a tool for companies to communicate their CSR 
activities to external parties. Second, recent research suggests that the credibility of CSR 
reporting is dependent on whether companies adhere to leading reporting standards, like the 
GRI. These standards function both as a means for companies to formulate their CSR strategies 
and for stakeholders to subsequently evaluate them (Du, Bhattacharya and Sen 2010; 
Rodriguez-Fernandez 2015; Wilburn and Wilburn 2013). Therefore, reporting on CSR and 
actual CSR activities are strongly correlated (see on this topic, Dhaliwal et al. 2011)
The data used in this analysis is limited to European firms (including Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, United Kingdom, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Spain, France, 
Greece, Netherlands. Portugal, and Ireland) for the period 2007-2012. An important focus of 
this analysis is how nuanced changes to financial volatility and public scrutiny impact CSR 
reporting. As such, we only include firms committed to yearly CSR reporting (i.e., firms that 
are missing reports for certain years are excluded). Our data therefore comprises 151 individual 
firms and 734 CSR reports for the six years of this study. A complete list of firms used in this 
study as well as breakdown of firms by country can be found in the online appendix. 
The GRI index scores firms’ CSR reporting on a six-point scale that ranges from C to 
A+, capturing variation in the extensiveness of a firm’s reporting. High scores, like ‘A+’, are 
given to reporting practices that provide extensive detail on a very large number of CSR 
commitments on an inclusive range of performance indicators, including “economic”, 
“environmental”, “labor practices and decent work”, “human rights”, “society”, and “product 
responsibility” categories. Low scores, like ‘C’, are given to reports that give only very basic 
details. In the timeframe of our research, firms used the GRI 3.0 standard for reporting.6 Firms 
assess their own reports (level C, B or A) against the criteria of the GRI Application Level. 
Firms can choose to either have a third party offer a second opinion or request a GRI check, 
resulting in a ‘plus’ (+) added to the application level afterwards. For the purposes of this 
analysis, we only use third-party checked and GRI checked reports and hence we recoded the 
ranking system on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 (C), 2 (B), and 3 (A). The higher a firm’s 
scores, the more extensive the CSR reporting is. 
Financial Volatility 
We measure financial volatility using data derived from the European Central Bank’s 
Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS).7 CISS measures the current state of instability 
in European financial markets bringing together data on five segments of the financial system: 
6 For additional information on GRI Application Levels see: 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3-Application-Levels.pdf
7 The Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress can be found online at: 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9551138
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the sector of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, money markets, securities markets, 
as well as foreign exchange markets. Yearly data on financial stress in each country were 
calculated from monthly values and are appropriate for the data on firms’ GRI scores, which 
are measured annually. Financial volatility values range from 0 to 1, with higher scores 
indicating greater levels of volatility. Determining each firm’s home country allowed us to link 
data on national financial volatility to firms’ GRI scores. CISS data present an ex post measure 
of systemic risk (Holló, Kremer & Lo Duca 2012, p. 2). As such, and in order to mitigate issues 
of endogeneity, financial stress values for the year preceding the GRI reports were used in the 
regression analyses. This approach to measuring the effects of the financial crisis on GRI marks 
an important advance on existing studies. Existing studies treat the financial crisis as a single, 
monolithic event that does not vary over time nor across countries. Indeed, most existing 
scholarship operationalizes the crisis using a binary indicator distinguishing simply between 
the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods (e.g., Lopatta & Kaspereit 2014, p. 485). CISS data allows 
us to examine correlations between volatility and CSR reporting in each of the six years of our 
data set as well as to capture important fluctuations in volatility in different countries in 
different years. 
We argue that CISS data provides a fine grained and compelling measurement of 
financial volatility. It is important to note that scholars have long used more general macro-
economic indicators to control for economic hardship in studies of CSR. As noted above, 
existing research suggests that the decision to report on CSR commitments is also related to a 
firm’s immediate economic environment. That is, firms will be less likely to engage in and 
report CSR if operating in “relatively unhealthy economics environments where the possibility 
of near-term profitability is limited” (Campbell 2007, p. 945). Research measures the relative 
economic health that firms’ encounter in terms of inflation and weak business and consumer 
confidence. As expected, there are problems of multicollinearity if we were to include these 
indicators along with our CISS data in our regression models. As such, we have performed a 
series of robustness tests and present the results below. The data, all drawn from World 
Development Indicators include Inflation (higher scores = higher inflation), Business 
Confidence (higher scores = greater confidence), and Consumer Confidence (higher scores = 
greater confidence). 
Public Scrutiny
Public scrutiny is measured as the amount of news media coverage of each individual firm in 
our dataset for the entire period of the study and measured on a yearly basis. To this end, and 
using the online database Factiva, we searched for all mentions of each individual firm in our 
dataset by name (either full name or full name and acronym) for each year of our study.8 We 
did this in two ways. First, we coded for all mentions in all the national newspapers in a firm’s 
home country. This provided our measurement of National public scrutiny. Second, we coded 
for all mentions in all newspapers that are not in a firm’s home country. This gave us our 
measurement of International public scrutiny. Examining national and international scrutiny 
separate gives us insight into the unique transnational pressures that firms may face relative to 
the pressures that they may face at home. However, examining the data shows a very high level 
of correlation between our two measures of public scrutiny.9 Therefore we opted to use a third 
8  Note that we focus solely on the amount of news media attention that firms receive and not the content or tone 
of news media articles; i.e. negative versus positive mentions of individual firms. This operationalization is 
informed by our definition of public scrutiny as firm visibility. A firm’s visibility in news media is independent 
of the content or tone of a news media article and therefore purely determined by amount of attention received 
(i.e. both positive and negative news media coverage increase the visibility of a firm in the news media).
9 The correlation coefficient for National Public Scrutiny and International Public Scrutiny is 0.83.
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indictor, Public scrutiny, which combines National and International public scrutiny. Public 
scrutiny was log-transformed to normalize distribution.
Comparing Financial Services Sector to Other Sectors
Part of our goal in this analysis is to compare the effects of the financial crisis on CSR reporting 
in finance to firms in other sectors of economic activity. To this end, and using data from the 
GRI dataset, we have coded all 170 firms in our dataset in terms of their main economic sector 
of activity, making a key distinction between Financial Industry Firms (including banks, 
insurance providers, and securities firms) and firms from all other sectors. Overall, there are 
32 different economic sectors in our data. A full breakdown by sector is available in the 
appendix. 
Control Variables
In addition to operationalizing our hypotheses, we also include several control variables in our 
analysis. These are largely derived from the broader institutional CSR literature. 
First, a central insight in extant studies is that large firms tend to engage in more CSR 
than smaller firms (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Bouten, Everaert, Van Liedekerke, De Moor 
and Christiaens 2011). Large firms are both more visible to the public than smaller firms and 
their superior resources make CSR easier to implement. Firm size is operationalized using GRI 
data indicating whether firms in our dataset are (1) small firms, (2) large firms, or (3) 
multinational firms. A small firm has a headcount under fifty and a turnover and balance sheet 
under 10 million a year. If a firm exceeds these numbers it is considered a large firm. 
Multinational firms, on the other hand, are defined as firms that produce goods or deliver 
services in more than one country.
Second, scholars have pointed out that firms’ decisions regarding CSR commitments 
might be motivated by inter-sector competition. Firms engage in less CSR when there is either 
too much or too little inter-sector competition. Too much competition means that a firm’s profit 
margins are narrow and that these firms will not want to spend money on CSR. Too little 
competition, and firms will have little incentive to use CSR to enhance their “competitive 
advantage” (Porter & Kramer 2002, Campbell 2007, pp. 953-54). We measure competition by 
combining two different scores using data from the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI): 
namely, ‘domestic competition’, and ‘foreign competition’. The resulting index, Competition, 
has values ranging from 1 to 5, where 1=very low competition and 5=very high competition.
Third, firms’ CSR engagements increase if there are strong and well-enforced state 
regulations in place to ensure such behavior. Robust legal systems, which effectively protect 
outside investors, reduce the incentives for insiders to act in irresponsible ways, such as 
engaging in the manipulation or obfuscation of a firm’s earnings to conceal their own rent-
seeking behavior (Campbell 2007, p. 955). We use data on countries’ legal systems from the 
World Justice Projects Rule of Law index (2012). Year-level data includes values that range 
from 0 (no legal enforcement) and 1 (perfect legal enforcement). 
Fourth, we control for Varieties of Capitalism and for sectoral impact. Firms operating 
in Liberal Market Economies (LME) face different and more explicit and pronounced pressures 
to carry out CSR commitments than firm in Coordinated Market Economies (CME) (Kang & 
Moon 2012). Following data presented in Jackson and Apostolakou (2010, p. 379), we created 
a dummy variable distinguishing between LMEs and CMEs. LMEs (coded as 1) include the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. CMEs (coded as 0) include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Netherlands and Portugal. 
Additionally, we introduce a dummy variable for high impact versus medium-low impact 
industries. Again, we use data from Jackson and Apostolakou (2010, p. 379). High impact 
sectors (coded as 1) include automobiles, basic resources, chemicals, construction and 
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materials, food and beverage, oil and utilities, retail, and utilities. Medium-low impact sectors 
(coded as 0) include banks, consumer goods, consumer services, financials, insurance, media, 
technology, telecommunications, and travel and leisure. 
Fifth, scholars have pointed out a link between CSR and the business education 
environment. CSR reporting will be more extensive if firms “operate in an environment where 
normative calls for such behavior are institutionalized, for example, in important business 
publications, business school curricula, and other educational venues in which corporate 
managers participate” (Chih, Chih, & Chen 2010, p.118). The education environment can pose 
a normative pressure on firms by setting standards for legitimate organization practices (Matten 
& Moon 2008, p. 412). We measure business education environment using GDI data on the 
Quality of management schools. Values range from 1=worst, to 7=best.
Finally, CSR might be a function of employer-employee relations. The thinking is that 
CSR reporting is more extensive if firms “belong to trade and employers’ associations, but 
only if these associations are organized in ways that promote socially responsible behavior” 
(Campbell 2010, p.960). CSR reporting tends to more extensive when firms engage in 
institutionalized dialogues with unions, employees, community groups, investors, and other 
stakeholders. To measure these relations, we again use GCI data on Labor-Employer Relations. 
Scores range from 1-7, where 1=very poor relations, and 7=very good relations. 
Analysis and Findings
To test the relative explanatory power of our hypotheses, we estimate a series of multi-level 
regression analyses with random intercepts at two levels: year and country. As CSR reporting 
takes on three ordered values, we estimate the models using ordered logistic regression. A test 
for multicollinearity among our independent variables revealed problems of high correlation 
between three control variables: Competition index, Legal system, and Labor-Employer 
Relations.10 We therefore test Legal system and Labor-Employer Relations in separate 
regression models treating the results as a robustness test for our analyses. 
Our main regression results are presented Table 1 in four different models. Model 1 is 
a ‘baseline’ model where we only include our control variables. Models 2 and 3 test H1 and 
H2 respectively. Model 4 includes all our variables. H3, predicting differences related to firms 
engaged in financial service provision, is examined in each model via the control variable 
Financial services industry where the reference category is non-financial industry firms.
10 A correlation matrix of all independent variables is presented in our online appendix.
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Table 1: Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of CSR Reporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline H1 H2 Full
  Financial volatility 4.787*** 4.512***
(4.09) (3.78)
  Public scrutiny 1.303*** 1.299***
(8.15) (8.05)
Control Variables
  Firm size 1.097 1.095 0.802 0.802
(0.67) (0.66) (-1.50) (-1.50)
  Financial services 0.913 0.912 0.649* 0.651*
(-0.46) (-0.47) (-2.08) (-2.05)
  Competition 1.398 1.956* 1.251 1.656
(1.02) (2.11) (0.71) (1.60)
  Liberal market economy 2.072 1.821 1.445 1.306
(0.54) (0.42) (0.27) (0.19)
  High impact sector 1.624** 1.627** 1.643** 1.656**
(3.07) (3.08) (3.05) (3.10)
  Quality of management schools 0.517 0.351 0.692 0.489
(-1.18) (-1.87) (-0.67) (-1.29)
Cut point 1 -0.33 3.33 0.25 3.26
(3.80) (3.44) (3.7)1 (3.49)
Cut point 2 1.97 5.65 2.75 5.78
(3.79) (3.45) (3.71) (3.49)
Log likelihood -825.97 -817.94 -760.18 -753.06
Observations 1020 1020 970 970
Notes: Odds ratios with t statistics in parentheses. Number of Countries = 15; Number of Year-groups = 90; 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Results in Tables 1 provide strong support for H1, predicting a positive correlation between 
high levels of financial volatility and more extensive CSR reporting. Specifically, as we can 
see in model 2, with each additional increase in Financial volatility the odds of more extensive 
CSR reporting are about 4.4 greater. Marginal effects, presented in Figure 2, help interpret 
these results. In the left-hand figure, we can see that the probability of firms receiving a high 
CSR reporting score (A) increases from about 40% to nearly 70% as financial volatility moves 
from 0 (very stable) to 1 (very volatile). At the same time, the probability of having lower CSR 
reporting scores (B and C) decreases as financial volatility increases. Our findings clearly 
challenge existing studies predicting a negative correlation between economic hardship and 
financial crisis and firms’ CSR reporting. Importantly, this positive correlation suggests that 
the link between financial crisis and CSR reporting is not wholly structured by a firm’s bottom 
line. Even though CSR might be costly and an easy thing to jettison during uncertain and 
economically challenging times, the fact that extensive CSR reporting increases as the crisis 
deepens reflects our argument that firms understand the importance of rebuilding public trust 
especially during trying times. 
Regression results also support H2. Specifically, there appears to be a strong positive 
correlation between Public scrutiny and more extensive CSR reporting. The news media appear 
to play a crucial role in bringing firms to the attention of the public and, in turn, pressuring 
firms to report more extensively on their CSR commitments. As presented in model 3, we see 
that each additional news media ‘mention’ increases the odds of more extensive CSR reporting 
by a factor of about 1.3. The marginal effect of public scrutiny on CSR reporting are also 
telling. The right-hand figure in Figure 2 shows a marked upswing in the probability of firms 
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having higher CSR reporting scores as Public scrutiny increases, moving from a 20% 
probability to about an 80% probability. As expected, the probability of having lower CSR 
scores decreases as public scrutiny increases. Firms facing intense news media coverage appear 
to engage in more extensive CSR reporting. 
Figure 2. Marginal effects of Financial Volatility and Public Scrutiny on CSR Reporting
Note. Results are based on estimations in models 2 and 3 respectively. The solid line depicts the marginal effects 
on the dependent variable. Dotted lines depict the 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effect.
The results for H3, examining potential sector-specific differences related to firms 
operating in the financial services industry, are mixed. The results are either not significant (as 
in models 1 and 2) or significant but negatively correlated with CSR reporting (as in models 3 
and 4). While this finding may appear to contradict our expectations in H3, we need to be 
careful in interpreting the results as they are likely sensitive to differences in the specifications 
in our various models. Indeed, examining marginal effects for Financial volatility and Public 
scrutiny can shed some light on these differences between finance and firms in other sectors. 
Figure 3, plotting the marginal effects for Financial volatility and Public scrutiny on CSR 
reporting (based on the results in models 2 and 3 respectively) show that there are actually few 
differences between financial service providers and firms in other sectors. In both cases, we 
can see that the likelihood of firms receiving a high CSR reporting score increases dramatically 
as Financial volatility and Public scrutiny increase. While financial service providers have 
slightly higher values than firms in other sectors, these differences are non-significant given 
overlap in confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3. Effects of Financial Volatility and Public Scrutiny on CSR Reporting
Note. Based on estimations in models 2 and 3. CSR = A (outcome 3). The solid line depicts the marginal effects 
on the dependent variable. Dotted lines depict th  95% confidence intervals of the marginal effect.
While it seems that there are only negligible differences between financial firms and 
firms in all other sectors, there are nevertheless large differences in actual news media 
coverage. In fact, our data shows that public scrutiny disproportionately targets finance, at least 
in the time period covered in this analysis. Indeed, from 2007 to 2012 firms operating outside 
of finance received about 4300 news media mentions per year. By contrast, finance, in the same 
time period, has anywhere from 12,000 mentions in 2007 to nearly 30,000 mentions in 2012. 
While public scrutiny may drive firms to increase ext nsive CSR reporting, the impact of 
public scrutiny on CSR reporting is not incremental, where each new news media mention 
leads to proportionate increases in CSR. Turning quiet politics loud is not a function of the raw 
amount of news media mentions. Instead, the process appears to require a certain threshold of 
increased new media attention and additional mentions above this do not add significantly to 
how public scrutiny affects CSR reporting. Financial sector firms are perhaps slightly less 
sensitive to news media attention, but they are certainly not impervious to its effects.
Robustness Tests
We provide two tests for the robustness of our results to assess the sensitivity of our models to 
alternative specifications. Results are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of CSR Reporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  Financial volatility 3.772*** 4.777***
(3.40) (3.80)
  Public scrutiny 1.301*** 1.302***
(8.11) (8.14)
Alternative Indicators for Economic 
Hardship
  Inflation 1.012
(0.18)
  Consumer confidence 0.992
(-0.26)
  Business confidence 0.872*
(-2.54)
Alternative Indicators for Competition
  Legal system 0.131
(-0.56)
  Labour-employer relations 1.715
(1.45)
Control Variables
  Firm size 1.097 1.097 1.103 0.804 0.798
(0.67) (0.67) (0.71) (-1.49) (-1.53)
  Financial services 0.913 0.912 0.922 0.655* 0.648*
(-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.41) (-2.03) (-2.08)
  Competition 1.411 1.450 0.901
(1.04) (1.04) (-0.31)
  Liberal market economy 2.061 2.044 1.463 0.455 1.392
(0.53) (0.52) (0.30) (-0.56) (0.26)
  High impact sector 1.624** 1.623** 1.641** 1.664** 1.660**
(3.07) (3.07) (3.13) (3.13) (3.11)
  Quality of management school 0.512 0.490 1.021 1.027 0.662
(-1.19) (-1.19) (0.04) (0.07) (-0.93)
Cut point 1 -0.21 -0.81 -17.21 -2.11 -0.29
(3.84) (4.23) (7.45) (2.61) (2.11)
Cut point 2 2.09 1.49 -14.89 0.39 2.21
(3.84) (4.23) (7.44) (2.61) (2.11)
Log likelihood -825.95 -825.93 -822.03 -752.63 -753.34
N 1020 1020 1016 964 970
Notes: Odds ratios with t statistics in parentheses. Number of Countries = 15; Number of Year-groups 90
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The first test is related to our main finding, namely that financial volatility drives firms 
to increase, rather than decrease, the extensiveness of their CSR reporting. It is important to 
provide a robustness test for this finding given the extent to which it challenges existing 
scholarship. To this end, models 1, 2 and 3 examine the determinants of CSR using alternative 
measures for financial volatility mentioned above, namely Inflation, Consumer confidence, and 
Business confidence. Results for Inflation and Consumer confidence show no significant 
differences in the models while Business confidence shows a negative correlation with CSR. 
In other words, as Business confidence decreases, firms engage in more extensive reporting of 
their CSR commitments. These results provide more support for our main finding and suggest 
that our Financial volatility indicator is not driving the results in a particular direction. 
One other remaining challenge to our findings is that our results are unique to Europe 
and / or the European sovereign debt crisis. European firms traditionally engage in ‘implicit’ 
forms of CSR (Koos 2012) and their response to the financial crisis may have resulted in 
exaggerated forms of ‘explicit’ CSR (leaving implicit CSR structures unchanged). However, 
our analysis includes an important distinction between liberal market economies, where 
scholars have identified that explicit forms of CSR are most prevalent, and coordinated market 
economies, where we tend to see implicit CSR. The results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that our 
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indicator Liberal market economy shows no significant differences in any of the models and 
hence between these ‘varieties’ of welfare capitalism. Further tests of the reliability of our 
findings would require extending our analysis to other countries or regions, but at the same 
time retaining a fine-grained measure of financial volatility consistent with the data use here.  
Lastly, as a result of issues of multicollinearity discussed above, we were unable to 
include several control variables that are commonly used to examine institutional determinants 
of CSR. In our robustness tests (models 4 and 5) we replaced Competition index with two 
alternative indicators: Legal system and Labor-employer relations. Given their highly-
correlated nature, it is perhaps not surprising that these alternative indicators, like the 
Competition index, show no significant differences in any of our models. More importantly, by 
changing model specifications we did not affect our findings in our main models and hence 
there is little evidence that these main models are not sensitive to these changes in model 
specifications. 
Conclusions
Our analysis examines the determinants of CSR reporting and, in particular, the effects of the 
financial crisis and public scrutiny on CSR reporting of firms operating in the financial sector. 
Our main aim was to present and test a more theoretically rigorous framework for how financial 
volatility and visibility impacts firms’ CSR decisions. As such, we build on recent advances in 
the CSR literature related to institutionalism. We also challenge the view that firms will jettison 
CSR commitments during times of economic hardship and financial volatility. We argue that 
financial crises carry important non-economic costs, especially those related to a firm’s 
position in society, declining levels of trust, and the fear of more stringent national and 
supranational regulation. Financial crises, or moments of extreme financial volatility, have 
demonstration effects that can implicate fi ms from certain economic sectors in a crisis and 
thereby shine a light on their behavior. The news media also plays an important role in drawing 
public attention to these same firms. Taken together, demonstration effects can drive firms to 
rebuild public trust by engaging in more extensiv  reporting on their CSR commitments. 
We tested these arguments using a unique dataset. Results supported both of our 
hypotheses: increased financial volatility and increased public scrutiny are strongly and 
positively correlated with more extensive CSR reporting. However, our results show that 
financial service providers are not uniquely susceptible to the pressures related to firm visibility 
even during times of extreme financial volatility. Instead, our findings show that finance is 
slightly more resistant to these effects. While financial firms do tend to respond to public 
scrutiny by engaging in more extensive CSR reporting, this effect is not proportional to the 
extreme levels of public scrutiny they faced especially during the height of the financial crisis.
Our analysis contributes to a growing literature on the institutional determinants of 
CSR. In addition to challenging the view that economic hardship has a negative impact on 
CSR, our analysis builds on recent research in the field of international business studies. In 
particular, while most studies examine financial crises using a dummy variable for the crisis, 
we use a fine-grained measure that captures the transnational and systemic character of 
financial volatility. Moreover, we include an indictor measuring public scrutiny that captures 
news media attention both nationally and internationally.  
Our analysis focused exclusively on European firms. This had the benefit of allowing 
us to control for various contextual factors that are otherwise difficult to observe in statistical 
analyses of this kind. Nevertheless, the question remains about generalizing our findings 
beyond Europe. To what extent, for instance, have US-based firm reacted to the same pressures 
in the same way? Further studies could use our approach to examining demonstration effects 
and public scrutiny in different contexts and perhaps also for longer time periods. Barring that, 
scholars could also expand on our dataset by including more European countries. Eastern 
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European countries are unfortunately absent from our dataset (a function of data availability). 
While these data are not readily available in the GRI data, one approach would be to merge 
GRI data with other sources, like the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and the KMPG 
International Survey of CSR Reporting. One challenge of doing this, however, is determining 
how to merge data that tends to measure the same thing but in different ways. Indeed, part of 
the larger problem is settling on a definition, and consequently measurement, of CSR. As 
Votaw (1972, p. 25) pointed out decades ago, “corporate social responsibility means 
something, but not always the same thing to everybody”. Further, our empirical analyses 
focused on the reporting of CSR, assuming a close interconnection between actual CSR 
commitments and CSR reporting. Further research should test whether firms actually increase 
both their CSR reporting and their CSR activities, or that the CSR reporting is rather symbolic 
and firms simultaneously decrease actual investment in CSR.
Our results have specific scholarly and policy implications. First, while not our primary 
focus, our analyses found only little evidence supporting many of the main explanations of 
CSR in the existing literature. Specifically, we found little evidence that labor-employer 
relations, consumer confidence, quality of management schools, inflation, or a country’s legal 
system have any bearing on CSR reporting. This stands in sharp contrast to leading existing 
studies. Of the ‘usual suspects’, only competition, business confidence, and sector impact 
appear to affect a firm’s reporting on CSR commitments. These results, especially as they relate 
to labor-employer relations and quality of management schools, have direct policy 
implications. Policies meant to enhance CSR based on manipulating these factors are therefore 
very likely off base. Instead, a firm’s decision to engage in, and report on, CSR is far more a 
function of exogenous factors that governments would be hard pressed to transform into policy 
initiatives. This finding also supports the view that most CSR reporting is ‘reactive’ rather than 
‘proactive’. As our results show, extreme financial volatility and increased news media 
attention are key to getting firms to engage in more extensive reporting of their CSR efforts. 
Pressure to increase CSR commitments have less to do with a firm’s bottom line and more to 
do with non-economic concerns over their public reputation and perceptions of trust amongst 
the general public. 
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
CSR 4.40 1.67 1 3
Financial volatility 0.35 0.21 0.04 0.94
Public Scrutiny (log) 5.66 2.80 0 11.36
Firm Size 2.05 0.51 1 3
Competition 3.86 1.27 1 5
Financial service 
providers
0.15 0.36 0 1
Quality of management 
schools
5.24 0.54 3.7 6.16
Legal system 0.73 0.12 0.54 0.89
Liberal market economy 0.12 0.32 0 1
High impact sector 0.42 0.49 0 1
Labour-employer 
relations
4.82 0.77 3.33 6.32
Business confidence 100.01 1.57 95.04 102.84
Consumer confidence 101.20 2.93 95.66 108.74
Inflation 2.24 1.31 -4.48 7.94
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Figure A2: Number of Firms by Economic Sector 
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Table A3: Correlation Matrix
Financial 
volatility
Public 
scrutiny Firm size
 
Financia
l 
services Competition
Liberal 
market 
economy
High 
impact 
sector
Quality of  
management 
school
Inflatio
n
Consumer 
confidence
Business 
confidence
Legal 
system
Labour-
Employer 
relations
Financial volatility 1
Public scrutiny 0 1
Firm size -0.06 0.26 1
 Financial services -0.02 0.13 0.02 1
Competition -0.41 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 1
Liberal market 
economy -0.12 0.22 0.1 -0.06 0.27 1
High impact sector 0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.36 -0.05 0.04 1
Quality of  
management school -0.18 -0.03 -0.1 -0.11 0.65 0.22 0.02 1
Inflation 0.12 0.08 0.07 -0.01 -0.16 0.21 -0.01 -0.12 1
Consumer confidence -0.25 -0.04 0 0.01 0.22 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 -0.74 1
Business confidence -0.13 -0.03 0 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.13 0.25 -0.46 1
Legal system -0.38 -0.12 -0.05 -0.02 0.88 0.15 -0.09 0.61 -0.21 0.21 0.17 1
Labour-Employer 
relations -0.4 -0.15 0.01 0.05 0.85 0.14 -0.04 0.43 -0.14 0.2 0.19 0.86 1
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Table A2: Firms and their Home Countries
Country Company name
Austria AGR
Austria OMV
Austria VERBUND
Belgium Bond Beter Leefmilieu Vlaanderen
Belgium Nyrstar
Belgium Protos
Denmark Cheminova
Denmark Eksport Kredit Fonden (EKF)
Denmark Novozymes
Finland Componenta
Finland OutoKumpu
Finland Vaisala Oyj
Finland Vantaan Energia
Finland Wärtsilä Corporation
France Atos
France PSA Peugeot Citroën
France Suez Environment
France Technip
France Telecom – Orange
Germany BASF SE
Germany Bayer AG
Germany BSH Group
Germany Deutsche Bank
Germany Deutsche Post DHL
Germany Deutsche Telekom
Germany E.ON
Germany EnBW AG
Germany Evonik Industries
Germany HypoVereinsbank (HVB)
Germany
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 
(LBBW)
Germany Munich Airport
Germany Studiosus Reisen
Greece ALPHA Bank
Greece Corinth Pipeworks
Greece Cosmote Mobile  S.A.
Greece Elval
Greece Halcor
Greece Hellenic Organization S.A. (OTE)
Greece National Bank of Greece
Greece S&B Industrial Minerals
Greece TITAN CEMENT
Greece Wind Hellas Telecommunication
Hungary Magyar Telekom
Hungary MOL Group 
Hungary OTP Bank
Ireland CRH
Italy A2A spa
Italy Acea
Italy Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.
Italy Autogrill S.p.A.
Italy Buzzi Unicem
Italy
Centrale del Latte di Firenze Pistoia 
Livorno (Mukki)
Italy Edison
Italy Enel
Italy Eni S.P.A.
Italy Filca
Italy Indesit
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo
Italy Iren
Italy Novamont
Italy Piaggio Group
Italy Romagna Acque
Italy Telecom Italia
Italy Terna
Italy UBI Banca
Italy Unicredit
Netherlan
ds Ahold
Netherlan
ds Alliander
Netherlan
ds Amsterdam RAI
Netherlan
ds ASN Bank
Netherlan
ds Delta Lloyd
Netherlan
ds DSM
Netherlan
ds HVC
Netherlan
ds ING Group
Netherlan
ds Rabobank
Netherlan
ds Royal Dutch Shell
Netherlan
ds Royal Wessanen
Netherlan
ds Schiphol Group
Netherlan
ds TNO
Netherlan
ds Triodos Bank Internationaal
Netherlan
ds Van Gansewinkel Group
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Portugal Corticeira Amorim
Portugal EDP
Portugal Lipor
Portugal
Millennium Banco Comercial 
Português
Portugal SOMAGUE Engenharia
Spain A Coruña Port Authority
Spain Abeinsa
Spain Abengoa
Spain Abengoa Bioenergía
Spain Abengoa Solar
Spain Abertis
Spain AENA
Spain Aguas de Murcia
Spain
Consejo General de Colegios 
Oficiales de Farmacéuticos de España
Spain Consum
Spain Deloitte
Spain Eduvic
Spain Enagas S.A.
Spain Endesa
Spain Fluidra
Spain Gamesa
Spain Grupo ACS
Spain IBERCAJA BANCO, S.A.U
Spain ITP (Industria de Turbo Propulsores)
Spain La Farga Group
Spain Mutua Universal
Spain NH Hoteles
Spain OHL Group 
Spain Red Electrica de España
Spain Repsol YPF
Spain Sanitas
Spain SegurCaixa Holding
Spain TERSA
Sweden Akademiska Hus
Sweden Almi Företagspartner
Sweden Assa Abloy
Sweden Atlas Copco
Sweden Atrium Ljungberg
Sweden Bilprovning
Sweden BostadsGaranti
Sweden Dramaten
Sweden Electrolux
Sweden Ericsson
Sweden Fagerhult Group
Sweden Holmen
Sweden Lantmännen
Sweden LKAB
Sweden Nordea Bank
Sweden RISE Holding
Sweden Samhall
Sweden SAS Group AB
Sweden SBAB
Sweden
SCA - Svenska Cellulosa 
Aktiebolaget
Sweden SJ
Sweden SKF Group
Sweden Specialfastigheter Sverige
Sweden SSAB
Sweden Sveaskog
Sweden SVEDAB
Sweden Svensk Bilprovning
Sweden Svenska Spel
Sweden Svevia
Sweden
Swedish Export Credit Corporation 
(SEK)
Sweden Systembolaget
Sweden TeliaSonera
Sweden Teracom AB
Sweden Trelleborg Group
Sweden Vasallen
Sweden Volvo Car Corporation
UK AMEC 
UK Anglo American PLC
UK Barclays
UK Berkeley Group
UK BG Group
UK BP
UK BT Group
UK Cairn 
UK Crest Nicholson
UK Deloitte LLP
UK InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG)
UK Johnson Matthey
UK Logica
UK Reckitt Benckiser
UK Reed Elsevier
UK Rio Tinto
UK SABMiller
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UK Santander UK
UK The Co-operative
UK Vedanta Resources
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